Water Law Review
Volume 12

Issue 1

Article 8

9-1-2008

Encouraging Stakeholder Participation in River Basin
Management: A Case Study from the Nura River in Kazakhstan
Andrew Allan

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Andrew Allan & Ilse Steyl, Encouraging Stakeholder Participation in River Basin Management: A Case
Study from the Nura River in Kazakhstan, 12 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 209 (2008).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

ENCOURAGING STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION
IN RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT:
A CASE STUDY FROM THE NURA RIVER IN
KAZAKHSTAN
ANDREW ALLAN* & ILSE STEYL**
210
INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................
I. HISTORICAL AND PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT ...................... 211
A. Historic Development of Water Management in
211
K azakh stan ..........................................................................
213
B . T he N ura River ....................................................................
H. EXISTING WATER MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE IN
216
KAZAKHSTAN ...................................................................
216
A . Water U se Licensing ..........................................................
220
B. Institutional structure ........................................................
222
C . River Basin Council ............................................................
225
D. Inform ation M anagem ent .................................................
227
Im. INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE ...............................................
228
A . Sou th Africa ........................................................................
229
B . P o lan d .................................................................................
23 1
C . Fran ce .................................................................................
232
D . Sco tlan d ..............................................................................
233
IV. CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................
A. Uncertainty caused by vague, contradictory, or missing
235
legislative provisions ...........................................................
B. Institutional issues (caused by mismatches between the
powers endowed by legislation and the functions of
236
institutions), or capacity .....................................................
C. Inadequacy and paucity of available information ............. 237
D. Slow acceptance on the part of institutions and
stakeholders regarding the involvement of the latter in
238
decision-m aking ..................................................................
*
Lecturer, Centre for Water Law, Policy and Science, University of Dundee
(www.dundee.ac.uk/water) - a.a.allan@dundee.ac.uk
** Research
Scientist, GeoData
Institute, University
of Southampton
(www.geodata.soton.ac.uk) - is@geodata.soton.ac.uk. The authors are grateful to the
following for their assistance and helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper:
Dr. Craig Hutton and Dr. Susanne Ullrich, both of the GeoData Institute at the University of Southampton. Rinat Begaliyev of Denton Wilde Sapte, and Asset Abdualiyev
of the University of Dundee also provided invaluable advice on Kazakh legislation. Any
errors remaining in the text, however, are the authors' own.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 12

E. A focus on the RBC as the fundamental means for
239
achieving stakeholder participation .............................

INTRODUCTION
Kazakhstan is one of a significant number of countries that have
recently re-formulated its policy and legal frameworks relating to water.' The country suffers from serious water problems mainly due to
the costly legacy of the extensive industrial and agricultural works undertaken during the Soviet era. Although water resources are not
scarce,3 Kazakhstan has generally not used them efficiently,' and the
country is now on the cusp of a major water crisis.5 The United Nations Development Programme identified Kazakhstan as a country facing severe water management problems, which may be detrimental to
its long-term economic growth.6
This paper concerns the Nura River basin in central Kazakhstan,
which terminates in the Kurgaldzhino wetlands west of Astana.7 The

1.

Other countries include South Africa, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan.

See Sarah L. O'Hara, Lessons from the Past: Water Management in Central Asia, 2
365, 370 (2000).
3. Kazakhstan has an estimated population ofjust over 15 million. See CIA, THE
WORLD FACT BOOK (2007), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/kz.html (suggesting a population of 15.28 million in July 2007); see also
The World Bank, Data and Statisticsfor Kazakhstan (2005),
http://www.worldbank.org.kz (follow "Data & Statistics hyperlink) (suggesting a population of 15.1 million in 2005). Per capita water use varies between 1,700-2,800m 3 per
year. LEONID DMrrRIEv, GLOBAL WATER P'SHIP CENT. ASIA AND CAUCASUS, IWRM
PRINCIPLES IMPLEMENTATION IN THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL ASIA AND CAUCASUS 57
(2004), http://www.cawater-info.net/library/eng/gwp/iwrm2004_e.pdf.
4. See, eg., TIM HANNAN, UNDP WATER GOVERNANCE FAciLrrY AT SIWI, THE PROCESS
OF PREPARING A NATIONAL LWR.M AND WATER EFFICIENCY PLAN FOR KAZAKHSTAN 2
(2006),
http://europeandcis.undp.org/WaterWiki/images/4/41/IWRMPlanProcessKazakhst
an.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Tatyana A. Saiko & Igor S. Zonn, Irrigated Expansion and Dynamics of
Desertificationin the Circum-Aral Region of CentralAsia, 20 APPLIED GEOGRAPHY 349, 353-55
(2000).
6. See generally UNITED NATIONS DEv. PROGRAMME, NATIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT KAZAKHSTAN 2003: WATER AS A KEY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT FACTOR 7-8 (2004),
(discussing
http://www.undp.kz/library-ofpublications/centerview.html?id=1484
water problems as a key factor in human development, and reviewing water resources
from an economic, environmental, and social perspective).
7. The Nura River is a closed system with the exception of the Irtysh-Karaganda
2.

WATER POL'Y

Canal. See infra Part II.B. For a useful detailed description of the Nura River, see T.W.
Tanton, M.A. Ilyushchenko & S. Heaven, Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Some Water Resources Issues of CentralKazakhstan, 148 WATER & MAR. ENGINEERING
227, 228-32 (2001).

Issue I

A CASE STUDYFROM THE NURA RIVER

Nura's particular difficulties are peculiar to it alone,8 but the broader
aspects of stakeholder participation that this paper seeks to address
apply equally to the Nura and to other rivers in Kazakhstan. Stakeholder participation is a novel concept in the country, and water users
are more accustomed to centralized decision-making and the paternalism of the Soviet system.
The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the steps Kazakhstan has taken to ensure effective stakeholder participation within
the water policy framework, focusing in particular on the establishment of representative River Basin Councils and on the availability of
information. Stakeholders repeatedly raised these two issues as outstanding areas of concern while interviewing with the authors. The
paper will suggest ways of improving these measures in the light of international practice in the fields of governance and integrated water
resources management. The paper will also assess the governance arrangements to determine whether the objectives of the water policy
can be successfully achieved by the legal and institutional frameworks
that exist to implement them.
Before setting out the measures taken to establish representative
basin organizations, we will, as an instructive purpose, provide a brief
hydro-political history of the Nura River. We will then detail some of
the current legislative context governing water use, and identify ambiguities and gaps in the legislative and institutional environments. We
will also highlight areas of specific concern to stakeholders before examining the problems associated with information availability. One
cannot view the River Basin Councils in isolation from the broader
regulatory framework; inadequacies and problems with the institutions
it is intended to "shadow" will have an impact on the way the representative body functions, and this may have corresponding effects on
the success of efforts to encourage stakeholder involvement. In part
four, we will briefly outline examples from other nations' experiences
with representative stakeholder bodies in order to assess whether Kazakhstan can learn lessons from these models.
I. HISTORICAL AND PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
A. HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF WATER MANAGEMENT IN KAZAKHSTAN

Russia annexed vast areas of Central Asia, including Kazakhstan,
during the second half of the nineteenth century.9 During this time,
engineers and agricultural specialists assessed the agricultural potential

8. For a more detailed discussion of the Nura's problems, see discussion throughout this article and discussion in Tanton et al., supra note 7.
9. SeeGEOFFREYHOSKING, RussIA: PEOPLE AND EMiRE 1552-1917 38-39 (1997).
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of these newly acquired lands.'" Remains of ancient irrigation canals
clearly showed the feasibility of irrigation in the central Asian region."
Russia intensified its expansion of irrigated territories after the 1890s.2
During the period from 1908 to 1915, Russia established a number of
water transfer and irrigation schemes in the region, mainly with a view
to support cotton production in an attempt to end its dependence on
American cotton." However, because the Tsarist government could
not afford to fund these vast projects, the actual expansion in the area
for irrigation was fairly modest.'4
In the 1920s, the Soviet Union took control of the Central Asian
countries" and, using central funds to cover costs, constructed large
irrigation schemes. 0 As a result, water demand increased dramatically,
especially following the advent of Krushchev's Virgin Lands scheme in
1954.'" This plan intended to plough up several million hectares of
fallow land in Kazakhstan, Siberia, the Urals and in the northern Caucasus.'" This resulted in the over-exploitaton of the region's water re19
sources.
The Soviet era completely centralized water management, and centrally determined production targets dictated regional water management strategies. 2' The break-up of the Soviet Union severed the link
between the centrally located managing authority in Moscow and the
vast network of irrigation schemes providing the basis for agricultural
production and funding.' Although the physical structures still existed, many of the region's rivers became international watercourses
overnight, and the five newly independent states - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - each became responsible for the maintenance of water infrastructure in their own territo10.

O'Hara, supranote 2, at 369.

11.

Id.

12. See, e.g., Saiko & Zonn., supranote 5, at 351.
13. O'Hara, supra note 2, at 374; see also HOSING, supra note 9, at 38, 389 (discussing the impact of the American Civil War on cotton production plans and Stolypin's
promotion of moves towards greater irrigation of the region).
14. O'Hara, supra note 2, at 369, 370, 374.
15. See id. at 375.
16. Id. at 370.
17. Charles E. Ziegler, Soviet Images of the Environment, 15 BRT.J. POL. Sci. 365, 373
n.23 (1985).
18. Frank A. Durgin, Jr., The Virgin Lands Programme 1954-1960, 13 SOVIET STUD.
255, 255 (1962). Many have documented the devastating environmental, social and
economic repercussions of this program. See, e.g., O'Hara, supra note 2; CENTRAL
EURASIAN WATER CRISIS: CASPIAN, ARAL AND DEAD SEAS 25 (Michael H. Glantz & Iwao
Kobori eds., 1998); Philip P. Mickin, Desiccation of the Aral Sea: A Water Management
Disasterin the Soviet Union, 241 SCIENCE 1170, 1170-76 (1988).
19. See Ziegler, supra note 17, at 373.
20. O'Hara, supra note 2, at 375 (discussing the workings of the centrally managed
irrigation system during the Soviet era).
21. Seeid. at 367.
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ries.' Unfortunately, the cost of maintaining these systems is immensely expensive and the governments have markedly reduced the number
of people working within the water management sector." The institutions that currently manage water at the national level are largely relics
of the Soviet past and share a focus on agriculture with associated assumptions regarding the role of the state in funding irrigation
projects. 4

B. THE NURA RIVER
The Nura River is a highly regulated closed system in central Kazakhstan. 5 The river is unusual in Kazakhstan insofar as it is not a
transboundary water: its only connection with international waters is
the Irtysh-Karaganda canal 6 that connects its upstream reaches with
the Irtysh River before the latter flows into Russia. 7 It is characterized
by generally low flow levels and flooding in the early spring." At 978
km in length, the Nura rises in the Karkaralinsk mountains, flows west
through the Karaganda region and past the new capital city Astana,
and finally discharges into the Kurgaldzhino wetlands and Lake Tengiz, one of the most important wetland sites in Central Asia. 9

22. Id.
23. Id. The United Nations Development Programme suggests that staffing levels
should be around ten times higher than they currently are, having fallen from these
levels since independence. See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, KAZAKHSTAN
NATIONAL INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT & WATER EFFICIENCY PLAN,

DRAFT NOVEMBER 2005,

http://rbec.undp.org/waterwiki/images/l/16/first-draft of national_lWRM%26wat
erefficiency-plan.pdf.
24. See, e.g., Fritz Schwaiger et al., Asian Dev. Bank, InstitutionalStrengthening of the
Committee for Water Resources (forthcoming) (outlining historical development of water
management agencies) (on file with author). For press release announcing commencement of the study, see Press Release, Government Steps up Efforts to Strengthen
Implementation of State Water Sector Programs,
http://209.225.62. 100/documents/reports/
japan.special-fund/2005/chap2.pdf.
25. Tanton et al., supra note 7, at 228.
26. Also known as the Satpaev Canal. See POSCH &PARTNERS, IDENTIFICATION OF
PRIORITY ISSUES IN SEVEN MAJOR RIVER BASINS IN KAZAKHSTAN 4 (2002),

http://www.worldbank.org/eca/kazakhstan/water/Ishim-eng.pdf.
27. See infra Figure 1 p. 6 .
28.

COMM. ON ENVTL. PoLIcY, UNITED NATIONS ECON. COMM'N FOR EUROPE

(UNECE), ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF KAZAKHSTAN

97 (2000),

http://wivw.unece.org/env/epr/studies/kazakhstan/contents.html.

29.

Tanton et al., supranote 7, at 228.
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are 1: Nura river basin in northern Kazakhstan

As a result of significant pollution discharges from the highly industrialized city of Temirtau, the river downstream from this point is
heavily contaminated with mercury." The Samarkand Reservoir at
Temirtau (with an approximate capacity of 254 million M 3)3 1 is the
main reservoir in the catchment and connects to the 458 km long Irtysh-Karaganda canal that stretches from the Pavlodar area to Karaganda.31 Although the canal originally intended to satisfy demand
from irrigators, the general absence of significant agricultural activity
on the Nura River now means that the canal's largest water users are

30. See id. (stating that 240 tons of mercury lie in the riverbed and the plain of the
river in the 75 kilometers below the source at the AO Karbide plant in Temirtau). The
earlier work of the UNECE suggested that this figure was nearer to 50 tons. The World
Bank is currently engaged in a project to clean up this pollution. See Press Release,
The World Bank Group, World Bank Supports Cleanup of Kazakhstan's Nura River
(May 9, 2003),
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/General/14A8FC1 C8FB9F6D485256D2 10
0529BA5?OpenDocument. The presence of mercury in the water is one of the main
reasons why the government has not used the Nura-Ishim canal to transfer drinking
water to the burgeoning new city of Atsana. The ironic result of this is that the Kurgaldzhino wetlands and the Lake Tengiz currently receive adequate water, but this
supply would be threatened in the event that the water becomes sufficiently safe to be
used for human consumption. See COMM. ON ENrrL. PoLicY, supranote 28, at 103.
31. Tanton et al., supra note 7, at 228.
32. Id. at 229.
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industrial concerns." Four such concerns link directly to the Samarkand reservoir."
The two largest industrial plants utilizing most of the water from
the Samarkand reservoir are a vast steel plant and a thermoelectric
plant. 5 The power plant apparently owns the infrastructure of the reservoir, which is therefore responsible for the maintenance of the reservoir." However, this company is bankrupt and has no significant
assets." As a result of the consequent failure to maintain the infrastructure, the State proposed that it take over ownership of the reservoir, and therefore responsibility for maintenance of the infrastructure; a suggestion that users have broadly welcomed."
The other potentially major consumer of water from the Nura is
the new capital city of Kazakhstan, Astana. Although Astana lies on the
Ishim River rather than the Nura, the two rivers share a flood plain,
and a canal exists between them. 9 Astana's population is growing very
rapidly" and pressure not only to use the water from the Nura, but to
protect the city from flooding, will grow commensurately.4' However,
major withdrawals of water at this point in the river may have devastating effects on the wetlands downstream. Thus, the government must
manage the Nura River carefully in order to balance its three major
sectoral users in a sustainable way.

33. See, e.g., Eric W. Sievers, TransboundaryJurisdiction and Watercourse Law: China,
Kazakhstan, and the Irtysh, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 4 (2002) (discussing the role, or lack of
one, of the Irtysh-Karaganda canal on the management of the Nura River and the
potential for it to play a crucial role in the provision of water to Atsana).
34. See K KUDAIBERGENULY, WATER RES. WORKING GROUP, ACTION PLAN FOR
PROTECTION AND RATIONAL UTILIZATION OFWATER RESOURCES 11 (1997),

77
.pdf.
http://www.atasu.org/eng/projects/docs/water%20action%20plan-19
35. Interviews by the authors and others with users of the Samarkand Reservoir,
Temirtau (Oct. 2005) (on file with author). See also, TwINBAS FINAL WORK PACKAGE

REPORT, TWINNI NING EUROPEAN AND THIRD COUNTRIES' RIVER BASINS DEVELOPMENT OF
INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT METHODS 25-26 (2007),

http://ivl.dataphone.se/twinbas/AP3%2Final%20Report%20A.pdf.
36.
Id.
See generally id. (stating that ownership and control of the dam has subsequently
37.
changed hands twice).
38. Id.
39. Id; see also supra Figure 1.
40. David Holley, BuildingKazakhstan'sBridge to the 21st Century, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17,
2005, at A8 (suggesting that the population of Astana will rise from around 600,000

currently to 1.2 million by 2030).
41. See Tanton et al, supra note 7, at 232.
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II. EXISTING WATER MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE IN
KAZAKHSTAN
The Kazakh government regards its future success as bound to improvements in its water management system and has therefore taken a
number of steps aimed at implementing Integrated Water Resources
Management ("IWRM")." In addition to committing itself to a number of international conventions and obligations," this process resulted
in the recent formulation of a new comprehensive Water Code," which
is intended to form the foundation of these efforts. In addition, a new
Environment Code was scheduled to be introduced at the end of 2006,
to replace the existing Law on the Protection of the Environment of
1997." The Government is cognizant of the importance of the role
stakeholders play in improving water management" and the Code includes attracting community interest and open availability of information amongst its guiding principles.
The institutional context that the Water Code must operate within,
however, inherited much of the Soviet legacy, and this has been less
than helpful to the overall pursuit of IWRM and to the open availability
and accessibility of accurate information."
A. WATER USE LICENSING

A number of different pieces of legislation and a variety of regulatory bodies govern water management in Kazakhstan. The principal
law on the issue is the 2003 Water Code, 5° and a plethora of regulations
sit beneath this.5' The code seeks to set up a water management re42.
See A.K. Kenshimov, Address to the 2006 Stockholm World Water Week, National Plan for Integrated Water Resource Management and Water Efficiency in Kazakhstan (2006),
http://cawater-info.net/4wwf/pdf/kenshimov-e.pdf.
43.
Id.
44. KAZAKHSTAN NATIONAL INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT & WATER
EFFICIENCY PLAN, DRAFT NOVEMBER 2005, supra note 23, § 1.7 (providing a comprehensive list of the the Kazakh government's commitments, including signing up to the
Johannesburg plan of implementation).
45.
Vodn'I Kodfks Rfspuieiki Kazakhstan [WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAz.]
No. 481-11 (July 2003) (further modifications have been made to the Water Code
three times since its promulgation).
46.
See KAZAKHSTAN NATIONAL INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT & WATER
EFFICIENCY PLAN, DRAFT NOVEMBER 2005, supra note 23, § 1.7.
47.
See A.D. Ryabtsev, On Public Participationin Water Resources Management, in 77

NATO

SCIENCE SERIES, IMPLEMENTING INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN

CENTRAL ASIA 89, 89-94 (Patricia Wouters, Victor Dukhovny & Andrew Allan eds.,
2007). Mr. Ryabtsev is the incumbent Chair of the Committee for Water Resources.
48. WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAz. No. 481-11 art. 9.

49.
50.

HANNAN, supra note 4, at 1-2.
Id. at 3.

51.

See WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAz. No. 481-11.
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gime that will "achieve and maintain environmentally friendly and
economically optimal levels of use and protection of the water fund for
conservation and improvement of living conditions for population
and environment"5' through implementation of the following principles:
53
" state regulation of water use and protection;
" sustainable water use through rational use and water resource
protection;
" establishing optimal conditions for water use, environmental sustainability, and the sanitary and epidemiological protection of
the population;
* basin-based administration; and
* combining decision-making regarding the use and control of water resources with economic considerations. 4

The Kazakh water use regime takes as its basic premise the idea
that the population may use all waters may be used by the population,
but it places restrictions on the uses of certain water bodies, and on the
types of use to which water may be put. Fundamentally, the law splits
uses into those that are allowed through the exercise of inalienable
rights and those that require authorization through licences or permits, so-called special uses." The Kazakh water regime broadly categorizes water bodies 6 according to the uses that may be made of them. 7
Water users may not undertake "special uses" without some form of
administrative approval from the licensing bodies in the form of a licence or permit. 8 Generally, only the abstraction of more than 50m 3
52. Id. art. 3(1).
53. Id. art. 8(1)-(2) (stating that the State owns all water). See also CONST. OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KAz. art. 6(3) ("The land and underground resources, waters, flora and
fauna, other natural resources shall be owned by the state. The land may also be privately owned on terms, conditions and within the limits established by legislation.").
54. WATER CODE OFTHE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. No. 481-11, art. 34.
55. See infra pp. 10-11.
56. The definition of "water bodies" does not appear to specifically include irrigation canals. WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. No. 481-11 art. 5. This is consistent
with the distinction between primary and secondary users, but may be seen as not being conducive to effective IWRM.
57. There are five types - common, joint, isolated, wildlife sanctuaries, and bodies
of special state importance. WNATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. No. 481-11 art.
11 (3). The code divides them into four further varieties, based on their physical characteristics: surface; sub-surface; sea; transboundary, id. art. 11(2), and see arts. 12-15
for detailed definitions.
58. Broadly, these uses include abstraction of water from water bodies for the purposes of irrigation; Ob Utverzhdenii Pravil Litsenzirobaniia Deiatel'nosti Po Spetsialnomu Vodopoleovaniiu, 1 1(2) (2004) [herinafter Regulations for Licensing the Activities for Special Water Use]; WATATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. No. 481-11 art.
95(4); industry and energy, id. art. 03; domestic supply, id. art. 66(5); fisheries (only in
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per day from surface waters for the purposes of agriculture, industry,
energy production, fish-breeding and transport require a license." In
practice, a further distinction exists between surface and ground water
use approval: the authors encountered stakeholders who had obtained
permits for the use of groundwater from the Committee for Geology
and Use of Underground Resources.'
Water officials cannot authorize licences and permits, however, unless the licensee has obtained the approval of the relevant local executive agencies responsible for the environment and for the sanitary and
epidemiological welfare of the local populations."1 Prospective licensees must also demonstrate that they have the use of the engineering
or infrastructure equipment necessary for carrying out the licensable
activity, and that they have suitably qualified responsible personnel. 2
The documentary requirements for the licensing of activities involving
abstraction of water and use in relation to hydropower are more onerous,"3 although the regulations do nothing more than demand "information" regarding, for example, fish protection.64 The actual information requirements are not set out in greater depth. Beyond this, the
criteria for the allocation of licences are vague, and the principles that
underlie the legislation therefore appear to govern allocation. Furthermore, it should also be noted that the authors were told by all
stakeholders interviewed that they had their surface water use licence
issued to them by the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment.
The water regime allows uses indefinitely or for limited periods,
but not lasting more than forty-nine years.6 Water officials can suspend licences in the event of the licensee breaching the provisions of
relevant, though unspecified, legislation,67 but officials may suspend
permits if the water user does not comply with the legislative provisions
limited circumstances), id. art. 66; waste discharge, id. art. 66(4); impoundment for
irrigation, id. art. 95(3); and in some cases navigation, id. art. 105(1).
59. Regulations for Licensing the Activities for Special Water Use, 1(2). Note that
there is some confusion in the Regulations and Water Code regarding the use of permits or licences, and a lack of clarity over the distinction between the two.
60. See infra p. 11.
61. Regulations for Licensing the Activities for Special Water Use, 1 2(5) (1)-(2).
Where the use demands it, licensees must also obtain the approval of veterinary bodies
and fish protection bodies. Id. at 1 2(5) (3)-(4); see also id. 1 4 (detailing the documentation required for the approval of licences).
62. Id. at 113(6), 3(7), 4(8)(7).
63. See id. at 4(10).
64. Id. at 14(10)(3).
65. For example, general uses are permanent. See WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KAz. No. 481-11 art. 70(6).
66. Id. art. 22. The Ministry issues short term rights for periods of less than five
years, long term rights last between five and forty nine years. Id. art. 22(3).
67. Regulations for Licensing the Activities for Special Water Use, 1 5(13).
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relating to water and to the environment." Water users may exercise of
both types of uses only in the light of available resources and the ecological condition of the water body,' although it is unclear if this
means that officials can suspend or revoke authorizations if ecological
quality or availability diminishes.
Additionally, if the relevant water body simply dries up, whether
through natural or artificial means, the government may terminate any
special use rights." If the holder of the special use rights does not adhere to the terms of use or does not use the rights for three years, the
issuing body can actively terminate use rights.71 If the state determines
that the resources are necessary for its own use, the state may administratively terminate the special rights." The issuing body may impose
other restrictions over water uses in certain circumstances, but the methodology detailing the application of these3 criteria, and the factors
involved in such procedures, is non-existent.
Finally, the issuing body makes a distinction between primary users
of water and secondary users. 4 Primary users are those that use water
for their own purposes directly from the water body, 5 and secondary
users receive their water from primary users under contractual arrangements. 6 This distinction between primary and secondary users is
important, as it effectively governs the River Basin Organziations'
("RBOs") licensing of water uses.7 For example, in a major irrigation
project the irrigation infrastructure manager/owner takes water from
the natural water body. This is the primary user, and it is this organization that the RBO licenses. The irrigation provider then supplies water
to farmers, the secondary users. The RBO does not license them, but
contracts in place with the irrigation provider (or water user cooperative, if one exists) govern their water use."
68.

Id. at

69.

WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAz. No. 481-11 art. 70.

11.

70. Id. art. 75(1)(5). The code does note elaborate on the difference between
"natural" and "artificial." Under art. 75(1), the automatic termination of rights may
also occur where the term of the authorization has expired, or the holder of the right
expires (whether by death of a natural person or the liquidation of other legal entities).
71. Id. art. 75(2). Under art. 75(2)(1), if a rights-holder does not use drinking
water resources used for one year, this will trigger termination. Given the RBO's need
for user self-monitoring, it seems improbable that many rights atrophy in this way.
72. See id. art. 75(4). Users can appeal such a decision, though the code does not
contain details relating to compensation payable and the circumstances justifying such
an action.
73. See id. arts. 74-75.
74. Id. art. 69.
75. Id. art. 69(1).
76. Id. art. 69(2).
77. See id. art. 69.
78. Id. Individual farmers can possibly be primary users, and therefore licensable,
if they take water from the body directly, but farmers are normally secondary. Indus-
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B. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

The Kazakh institutional structure for the management of water
operates at a number of geographic and political levels: the national,
oblast, basin, and rayon.79 The national executive agencies, including
the RBOs, are also represented at the oblast and rayon levels, and it
would normally be these local level bodies that were involved in the
day-to-day management of waters. "°
The body responsible for authorizing special uses varies depending
to some degree on the nature of both the use and the prospective user,
but the primary licensing body is the River Basin Organization.8' Article 49 of the Water Code identifies the following additional bodies
that are involved in water management (aside from irrigation management bodies):
* central executive body for environment protection;
* authorized body for subsoil use and protection (the Committee
for Geology and Use of Underground Resources, Ministry of
Energy and Mineral Resources);
* authorized state body for sanitary and epidemiological safety of
population (in the Ministry of Health);
* authorized state veterinary body;
* state body in charge of phytosanitary supervision; and
* local executive bodies - the Akimats. 2
In addition to this list, the following are also involved:
* Ministry of Agriculture;
" Kazgidromet (reporting to the Ministry of Environment Protection) ;83
trial concerns would normally be primary water users, though this may depend upon
the source of the water - a factory, such as the steel mill at Temirtau that withdraws
water from the Irtysh-Karaganda canal, would be bound by a contract with the canal

operator rather than by a licence from the river basin authority. The variety of sources
used by the mill means that it is bound both by contract and by licences relating to
each source.
79.

KAZAKHSTAN NATIONAL INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT & WATER

EFFICIENCY PLAN, DRAFr NOVEMBER 2005, supra note 23, §§ 9-1, 13-5.

80. Id. §§ 9-1, 10-1.
81. See Regulations for Licensing the Activities for Special Water Use,
3-5. In
addition, the Committee for Water Resources, the national water administration body,
is solely responsible for issuing licences and permits relating to the use of water from
those water bodies of special state importance, and it is also the only body that may
authorize foreign entity water use.
82.
83.

See WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. No. 481-11 art. 49.
See MIMSTRY OF ENV'T PROT. OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. & ORG. FOR SEC. AND

COOPERATION IN EUR., GUIDELINES ON HANDLING PUBLIC REQUESTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
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Agency for Land Resources Management;
Ministry of Industry and Trade;
Ministry of Emergency Planning;
Ministry of Economics and Budget Planning and Ministry of
Finance;
Ministry ofJustice;84 and
Local representative bodies - the Maslikhats.

Aside from their licensing functions, the Committee for Water Resources ("CWR") and the RBOs principally have a coordinating role
only, rather than having active management responsibilities. To some
degree, the RBOs view their role as being the administration of water
use limits set by the CWR.8 The CWR, however, is a department of the
Ministry of Agriculture, which results in an almost automatic conflict of
interest if the CWR desires to appear as an impartial coordinator of all
water uses. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is often friction
between basin organizations and the local Akims, the heads of the local
executive bodies, who report directly to the President's office. 6 The
functions of the RBOs and the Akims relate closely with respect to the
administration of waters, but the Akims have the advantage in terms of
sheer power, and the latter has more direct power over watercourse
The United Nations Development Programme
management."
("UNDP") believes that the RBOs are under-funded and suffer greatly
from the fact that the CWR does not have ministerial status." Internationally, it is not unusual to have a number of bodies making decisions
that impact water resource management, but the crucial requirement
in such contexts is the quality of the coordination. Anecdotal evidence
presented to the authors suggests that coordination is neither extensive nor formalized. In addition, a lack of both financial and human
resources largely cripple the RBOs. This renders enforcement of decisions difficult and compounds the views of some industrial concerns
that the RBO is toothlessly impotent.

INFORMATION 25, availableat
http://www.osce.org/documents/cia/2004/11/3787_en.pdf.
84. See KAZAKHSTAN NATIONAL INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT & WATER
EFFICIENCY PLAN, DRAFr NOVEMBER 2005, supra note 23, §§ 6-4, 6-5.
85. Id. § 1-7.
86. See id.
87. See, e.g., WATER CODE OF THE REPUBUC OF KAz. No. 481-11 art. 39(112)-(20).
88. KAZAKHSTAN NATIONAL INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT & WATER
EmcFNCY PLAN, DRAFr NOVEMBER 2005, supra note 23, § 6 (outlining suggested improvements to the status of the CWR).
89. Id. § 6-2.
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C. RIVER BASIN COUNCIL

Among the functions of the RBOs are the preparation of basin
agreements for the rehabilitation and protection of water bodies."
These agreements, which the relevant RBOs, local executive bodies,
and "other subjects" within the basin must conclude, seek to aid in the
coordination of the water management roles played by the signatories,9' and, according to Article 43(1) of the Water Code, also create
River Basin Councils ("RBCs"). The RBOs draw plans on the basis of
existing strategies and data outlining water use capacities, but the expected effects of the agreement are not set out, and preparation of
these agreements appears to lie with RBCs9 The RBCs have principally an advisory function 4 with respect to the parties to the agreement,
and have the power to make suggestions and recommendations
alone. They are essentially intended to develop cooperation between
members 7 and to advise on issues concerning the use and protection
of water resources.98

Membership consists of the head of the RBO (chair)," local executive and representative bodies,' 9 along with local users including representatives of other oblast-level executive agencies responsible for water
There is no inmanagement,' NGOs, and water user associations.'

90. Order from A. Ryabtsev, Chairman, Committee for Water Resources of the
Ministry of Agriculture, ORDER # 71-11 OF THE COMMITTEE FOR WATER RESOURCES OF THE
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN DATED 21 APRIL 2004, reprinted in
U.N. Development Program in Kaz., Committee for Water Resources, Ministry of Agriculture, Republic of Kaz., METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINE: ESTABLISHMENT OF RIVER BASIN
COUNCILS IN KAZAKHSTAN 27 (2005), (outlining suggested improvements to the status of
the CWR) available at

http://europeandcis.undp.org/WaterWiki/images/7/73/MethodologicalGuidelines_
Estd of RiverBasinCouncils.pdf.
91. WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. No. 481-11 art. 42(1).

92. Id. art. 43(1). But see Order from A. Ryabtsev, supra note 90, at 27, which obliges the RBOs to create the RBCs and to arrange for the preparation of the basin agreements.
93. WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. No. 481-11 art. 43(3).
94. Id. art. 43(1).
95. Id. art. 43(3).
96. See id.
97. STANDARD REGULATION OF RIVER BASIN COUNCIL, reprinted in U.N. Development
Program in Kaz., Committee for Water Resources, Ministry of Agriculture, Republic of
Kaz., METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINE: ESTABLISHMENT OF RIVER BASIN COUNCILS IN
KAZAKHSTAN 28 (2005), available at
http://europeandcis.undp.org/WaterWiki/images/7/73/MethodologicaGuidelines_
Estd-of RiverBasinCouncils.pdf.
98. Id. at 28-29.
99. Id. at 30.
100. Id. at 29 (making up no more than 20% of the total).
101. This section of the water code does not specify the exact composition of this
group, but it may be that it links directly back to those organizations referred to in
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dication as to how voting rights, if any, are split in the inevitable instances where basins overlap oblast boundaries, and the maximum
number of members is not set. It is worth noting, however, that the
director of the relevant RBO determines the initial composition of the
RBC."' Other individuals and representatives of other bodies may participate in meetings of the RBC, but only if the RBC specifically invites
them. °4
The RBCs must consider and advise upon the following documents:
"
*
*
*

river basin scheme proposals, with respect to the comprehensive use and protection of water resource;
local executive bodies' plans for the rational use of basin water
bodies;
draft agreements on the rehabilitation and protection of the
basin water bodies; and
other relevant documents requiring integrated decisionmaking.'

While the RBC has the power to advise and produce recommendations, the corresponding obligation on the part of the RBO or local
executive bodies to take the views of the RBC into account is very limited.' 6 The RBC may make its views known, but there is largely no
obligation on the part of the receiving authorities to listen. The exception to this appears to be with respect to the Basin Schemes of "waters'
complex use and protection."'' 7

481-11 art. 49; See STANDARD REGULATION OF
RIVER BASIN COUNCIL, supra note 97, at 28 (making up no more than 20% of the total).
102. WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC or KAz. No. 481-11 art. 43(2); STANDARD
REGULATION OF RIVER BASIN COUNCIL, supra note 97, at 29 (determining that users,

WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. No.

including non-governmental organizations and water user associations can make up no
more than 20% of the total membership). It is not clear which groups should make up
the remaining 40% of the composition of the Council.
103. STANDARD REGULATIONS FOR RIVER BASIN COUNCILS, supra note 97, at 29. The
RBO is also responsible for covering the costs of running the respective RBC, but only
from funds allocated to it from central government. Id. at 31.
104. Id. at 29. The Nura-Sarysu Basin Council has twenty nine members, drawn
from local Akimats (ten members in total, including only one from any of the maslikhats, thereby comprising more than 30% of Council membership), local executive
bodies (eight members), industry (eight members), the Korgalzhyn reserve body, and
an NGO (one member each). NGO membership therefore falls far short of the 20%
maximum. Full details of all members can be found at
http://ww.caresd.net/iwrm/new/en/doc/NS_ BQmembersilist.pdf.
105.

STANDARD REGULATIONS FOR RIVER BASIN COUNCILS, supra note 97, at 29.

106.

See Order from A. Ryabtsev, supra note 90, at 27.

107.

WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. No. 481-11 art. 46.
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Article 46 of the Water Code requires these schemes and develops
the obligation in greater detail for the development and approval of
general and basin schemes for comprehensive use and protection of
water resources and water balances of 2004. 08' Article 17 provides that
the basin scheme that the RBO submits to the CWR "reflect[s] the recommendation of the participants of the" RBC and "people."' ' "Reflect" is potentially a very strong word, and the intention is unclear as
to if the RBOs are bound by the views of the RBCs, or if they merely
ensure that the scheme is broadly reflective of the RBC's views. Either
way however, "reflect" provides a potentially potent means of imposing
the views of users and those bodies involved in management of waters
at the basin level on the basin scheme, although there is unfortunately
no mechanism for the communication of the draft scheme to the RBC
in the first place."'
This omission is especially noteworthy given the other detailed
procedures outlined in the regulations for the development of the
scheme and its passage through other relevant organizations."' It is
also important to recognize that it is the basin agreement, rather than
the basin scheme, that coordinates the work of all agencies that are
involved with managing water resources at the basin, oblast and rayon
levels."' The RBC therefore has some power in relation to one management document, but not with respect to the one instrument that is
intended to reflect the integrative character of the RBC's own composition. Moreover, a UNDP document suggests that it may be possible
to have more than one basin agreement in place, as they need not be
multilateral."3
In October 2005, the authors attended a meeting of many of the
prospective members of the Nura-Sarysu RBC in Karaganda."' The aim
of the meeting was primarily to identify any incentives that might make
key stakeholders choose to participate in the river management
process. " ' Missing from that meeting, however, were a number of major industrial users, who had also been absent from a preliminary meeting of the RBC members earlier in the year. Following the October
108. Id.
109. See id. art. 17.
110. Id.
111. See Regulations for Development and Approval of General and Basin Schemes
for Comprehensive Use and Protection of Water Resources,
14-19.
112. MINISTRY OF ENV'T PROT. OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. & ORG. FOR SEC. AND
COOPERATION IN EUR., supra note 83, at 4.
113.

See U.N. Development Program in Kaz., Committee for Water Resources, Minis-

try of Agriculture, Republic of Kaz., METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINE: ESTABLISHMENT OF
RAVER BASIN COUNCILS IN KAZAKHSTAN 8 (2005), available at

http://europeandcis.undp.org/WaterWiki/images/7/73/MethodologicaGuidelines_
Estd of RiverBasinCouncils.pdf.
114.

TwINBAs FINAL WORK PACKAGE REPORT, supa note 35, at 29.

115.

Id.
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meeting, the authors visited these industries to gauge their views on
the RBC. While the information that the industries provided occasionally conflicted with what was heard at the main meeting, their reasons
for doubting the usefulness of the RBC were illuminating. Both parties
were broadly of the view that, without proper powers, the RBC would
be little more than a discussion forum and that there was, therefore,
little point in being involved. There was also a feeling from one of the
parties that, even if the RBC were able to materially influence the decisions of the RBO, this would be of little consequence because parties
perceive the RBO as unable to exert control over the water use of industry in any case.' 6 This is important, as it provides a concrete example of one of the reasons why stakeholder participation fails to work in
some cases; when stakeholders lack rights that they can effectively enforce and because the law appears to be applied inconsistently."'
D. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Along with a number of other provisions within the Criminal and
Civil Codes,"8 the Water Code sets out a number of provisions designed
to fulfill open information goals."9 Firstly, the Water Code explicitly
states that one of the functions of the RBO is the dissemination of information on measures taken to protect waters and improve their condition, ° and they must provide public access to the state water cadastre. 1 ' Secondly, water users have the right to obtain information regarding the conditions of water bodies with respect to using them for
economic activity.'2 2 In addition, one of the principles underlying the
Water Code is the availability of information on the status of waters in
Kazakhstan. 3 On the broader matter of availability of information, the
Law on Environmental Protection of 1997124 provides a general right to

116. See id. at 31-33. For example, the requirement that users monitor their own
water use means that there is little incentive for them to provide accurate data and the
RBOs currently lack the capacity to enforce use limits effectively.
117. See, e.g., European Comm'n, Common Implementation Strategy for the Water Framework Directive GuidanceDocument No. 8 Public Participationin Relation to the Water Framework Directive, at 186, EC 2000/60 (2003) (discussing stakeholder cooperation on the
catchment level in the Eman River Basin, Sweeden), available at http://www.wrrlinfo.de/docs/Guidance doc_8Public-participaklein.pdf.
See MINISTRY OF ENV'T PROT. OF THE REPUBIC OF KAz. & ORG. FOR SEC. AND
118.
COOPERATION IN EUR., supra note 83, at 19-21.
119. WATERCODEOFTHEREPUBCcOFEKAz. No. 481-11 arts. 40(2)(19), 59(6), 71(5).
120.
Id. art. 40(2) (19).
Id. art. 59(6).
121.
122. Id. art. 71(5).
123. Id. art. 9(10), 71(5).
124. Eakon Respubliki Kazakhstan [LAwOF REPUBLIC KAZAKHSTAN] No. 160-1
(1997). An unofficial Russian version is available at
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/kaz25276.doc.
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2
reliable information with regard to the health of the environment. 5
The terms of the Arhus Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making, and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters further obligate Kazakhstan to uphold certain standard of
transparency.2 6 Article 4 of the Convention obliges parties to ensure
that:

... in response to a request for environmental information, [to] make
such information available to the public, within the framework of national legislation, including, where requested and subject to subparagraph (b) below, copies of the actual documentation containing or
comprising such information:
(a) Without an interest having to be stated;
(b) In the form requested.... 27
The Kazakh Constitution supports this, to some extent, in Article 18,
"[s] tate bodies, public associations, officials, and the mass media must
provide every citizen with the possibility to obtain access to documents,
decisions and
other sources of information concerning his rights and
2
interests."

The RBOs rely on the quality of the information the monitoring
agencies provide them. In addition to receiving information from water users themselves under their obligations for self-monitoring," the
principal source of this data is Kazhydromet,' 30 the main monitoring
organization of the Ministry of Environmental Protection.

Unfortu-

nately, this body relies on being able to sell its recent data in order to
continue surviving. 1' During the meetings the authors attended in
Karaganda, it became clear that Kazhydromet's reputation was low, the
quality of the data it provided was not highly regarded,'32 and the prices
demanded for such information were so exorbitant that even the RBO
125. Id. art. 5.
126. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making
and Access to justice in Environmental Matters ("Arhus Convention"), art. 3, 17,june
25, 1998, UN-ECE-CEP-43, adopted October 30, 2001, availableat
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/treatytext.htm.
127. Id. art. 4(1).
128. CONST. OF THE REPUBUC OF KAZ. art. 18, availableat
http://www.kazakhembus.com/Constitution.html.
129. See WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAz. No. 481-11 arts. 61(5), 72(9), 72(16).
130. Kazhydromet is the principal data source with respect to surface waters only.
Information on groundwater is the responsibility of the Committee for Geology and
Underground Resources. See MINIsTRY OF ENv'T PROT. OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAz. & ORG.
FOR SEC. AND COOPERATION IN EUR., supra note 83, at 22.
131. Id. at 26. Older data is freely available, but current information is provided
only in the context of a contract.
132. See id. (detailing Kazgidromet's managing of the monitoring infrastructure).
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did not wish to purchase it. The role of Kazhydromet therefore produces some problems in relation to the provisions set out above on the
availability of monitoring data and environmental information. Furthermore, the state water cadastre (established by and referred to
throughout the Water Code,)'.. has little additional legislative support,
so the mechanisms for generating and maintaining such a database are
sparse.
The Kazakh government has encountered further problems in relation to the implementation of the Arhus Convention; the Convention's Compliance Committee found Kazakhstan to be in breach of its
obligations. 11 The Committee's last recommendations on the issue,
which the Parties to the Convention approved in June 2005, specifically
requested that the Kazakh government produce a strategy for implementing the Convention by the end of that year.'36 While Guidelines
on the implementation exist, the parties did not regard these as sufficient.'37 Today, Kazakhstan still has not transposed the terms of the
Convention into Kazakh law.
II. INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE
International practice varies with respect to representative basin
The European Union Water Framework Directive
committees.
("WFD")' 3 for example, contains no specific provision on their establishment, but demands that "member states encourage the active involvement of all interested parties in the implementation of this Directive, in particular in the production, review and updating of the river
basin management plans.' 39 Member states may implement this as
they wish, within the overall framework of River Basin Districts.
France, for example, has an established system of sophisticated Basin
133.

See WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. No. 481-11 arts. 58-61.

134.

See KAZKHSTAN NATIONAL INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT & WATER

EFFICIENCYPLAN, DRAFT NOVEMBER 2005, supra note 23, § 13.7.

135. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. Economic Commission for
Europe, Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties,1 1, ECE/MP.PP/2005/2/Add.7, Decision II/5a, (June 13, 2005) availableat
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/compliance.htm.
136. Id. 1 5. Such a strategy was submitted by Kazakhstan in time for the Eleventh
Meeting of the Compliance Committee at the end of March 2006 and negotiations
appear to be ongoing. See U.N Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. Economic Commission for Europe, Report of the Eleventh Meeting of the Compliance Committee,
1 9, ECE/MP.PP/2005/2/Add/7 Decision II/5a, (May 10, 2006), available at
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/compliance.htm.
137. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. Economic Commission for
Europe, supra note 135, 1 1, 2.
138. Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the Community action in the field of water policy, art. 24, 2000
O.J. (L 327) 1 (EC), availableat http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/index.html.
139. Id. art. 14(1).

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 12

Committees. 40 England will have advisory liaison panels.'4 ' Scotland
will have River Basin District Advisory Groups. "' Poland, which recentlyjoined the European Union, created a system of Regional Boards of
Water Management.' 2
Outside the EU, South Africa has set up Catchment Management
Agencies ("CMAs"), which are statutory bodies with jurisdiction over
defined Water Management Areas.'44 These CMAs have the duty, under the National Water Act, to promote community participation in
4 1 5 Stakeholders participate through exwater resource management.'
tensive involvement in the water management process,' 6 and through
strict governance controls over the activities of management agencies
and their directors.' 7 In Brazil, new water legislation enacted in 1997
allows the National Council on Water Resources to establish River Basin Committees.'
These committees act as the instrument through
which stakeholders within
the basin can participate in water manage4 9
decision-making.'
ment
Generally, stakeholder participation works best when stakeholders
feel that they can make a tangible difference through their interventions.' ' This will only be effective, however, if the rights of the stakeholders are enforceable.
A. SOUTH AFRICA

The National Water Act, the principal water management legislation in South Africa, only states that the CMAs should promote public
participation and makes no direct provision for representative bodies

140.

See SALMAN M.A. SALMAN & DANIEL D. BRADLOW, REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR

WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STuDY 59-60 (2006).
141.
DEPARTMENT FOR FOOD, ENVIRONMENT AND RURAL AFFAIRS, RIVER BASIN PLANNING

GUIDANCE, 2006, at 40-41, availableat

http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/water/wfd/pdf/riverbasinguidance.pdf.
142. Water Environment and Water Services (Scot.) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 3), 17, available at www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/acts2003/pdf/asp-20030003_en.pdf.
143. William Blomquist, Andrezej Tonderski & Ariel Dinar, Institutional and Policy
Analysis of River Basin Management: The Warta River Basin, Poland 10-11 (World Bank
Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3528, 2005).
144. National Water Act 36 of 1998 § 8, (S. Afr.) availableat
http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Legislature/nw-act/NWA.pdf.
145. Id. § 9(g).
146. Id. § 81(1).
147. See, e.g., id. § 36; id. § (81).
148. Lei. No. 9.433 de 8 deJaneiro de 1997, D.O.U. de 09.01.1997. (Brazil), available
at http://www.brasilemb.org/environment/waterpolicy.shtml.
149. World Commission on Dams, ContributingPaper: Water Resources NationalPolicy in
Brazil at 9 (2000) (prepared by Raymundo Garrido), available at http://www.wcainfonet.org/cds-upload/ 1067863393045_brazil.pdf.
150. See, e.g.,
European Comm'n, supra note 117, at 186 (discussing stakeholder
cooperation on the catchment level in the Eman River Basin, Sweeden).
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to act as advisory bodies at the catchment level.'' However, it should
be noted that the National Water Resources Strategy states that it is the
intention of the relevant ministry to create representative bodies in
each Water Management Area 52 for the purposes of consultation exercises,' 5' with a view to reducing the likelihood of consultation fatigue. 4
In the current absence of such bodies, the National Water Act seeks to
include the public as a whole in decision-making, rather than identifying sectoral users and targeting these as stakeholder representatives.
In addition to this, however, the National Water Act establishes
stringent requirements regarding the constitution of CMA governing
The Minister selects appointees for the boards, and final
boards.
membership must be consistent "with the object of achieving a balance
among the interests of water users, potential water users, local and provincial government and environmental interest groups."' 7 Schedule 4
of the National Water Act then sets out the rules applicable to Governing Boards, which include mechanisms for the recovery of improperly
obtained profits and details of reporting requirements. 15 In the interest of both transparency and predictability, the National Water Act
clearly identifies the criteria the responsible authority will consider
when issuing water use licences. 5 Finally, CMAs are obliged to "strive
towards achieving co-operation and consensus in managing the water
resources under [their] control."'"
B. POLAND
Poland had already begun to conform to a catchment-based water
management system at the beginning of the nineteen ninties when it
created a system of Regional Boards of Water Management ("RWMAs")
151.

National Water Act 36 of 1998 § 8(5), (S. Ar.) availableat

http://ivww.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Legislature/nw-act/NWA.pdf.
152. There are nineteen such areas, based on catchments. See the establishment of
the water management areas and their boundaries as a component of the national
water resource strategy in terms of section 5(1) of the National Water Act. See GN 1160
at
available
1999,
October
1
of
GG20491
in
http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Notices/PROCL.doc.
153. Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, FirstEdition of the National Water Resources Strategy, § 4.3.1 (September 2004), available at

www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Policies/NWRS/Sep2004/pdf.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., National Water Act 36 of 1998, §§ 8-10, (describing the creation of
catchment management strategies and the consultation exercises that catchment management agencies must follow).

156.

Id. §§ 81-83.

157. Id. § 81(1)-(3). Although the minister makes appointments, he or she must
make the appointments in conjunction with an appointments advisory board.
158. Id. at sched. 4(8), (32).
159. See id. § 27.
160. Id. § 79(4).
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with the purpose of improving water quality, protecting drinking water
sources, and aiding water users and water user organizations develop
and implement rational water management. This was a departure from
the previous centralized water management system operated during
the Soviet-dominated era, where, as was the case in Kazakhstan, technical planning and large engineering projects were prevalent and focused mainly on supporting industrial and agricultural development.'6'
Although Poland decentralized water supply sanitation and waste disposal to the local level before the nineteen-nineties, the quality of
planning and management of the water resource was poor, especially
in more rural areas. 2 Poland, therefore, had no history of managing
the water resource in a holistic catchment-based manner. Participation
by stakeholders using the resource was also very limited.' 3
Possibly because of this historical context, public participation in
the RWMAs was never really well developed. Also, many of the boards
never consisted of more than a single individual, acting as a director,
and charged by the Ministry of Environment with management of the
basin.' This naturally hampered consistent and effective water management.'
Poland enacted a new water law in 2001."6 The basic principles of
the water law are based on sustainable and rational resource use. 7
Since Poland recently joined the European Union,'68 the WFD ultimately governs its water. 9 Although significant institutional changes
have occurred since the reforms started in 1990, (for instance, there is
a rational system of water tariffs in place, along with wastewater discharge controls and water resource planning processes),9 the central
government still controls strategic and fundamental financial means,
limiting the power of the RWMAs. In addition, Poland has no mechanism for catchment-level stakeholder participation. Organizational responsibilities and relationships are, in reality, less integrated than the
water law and policy would indicate, a factor that further hampers the

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Blomquist et al., supra note 143, at 11-12.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
See id.

166. Prawo wodne [Law of 18July, 2001, Water Law], Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of
Laws] No. 115, Pos. 1229, availableat http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/pol60008.pdf
(in Polish only).
167. See Blomquist et al., supra note 143, at 17; Andrzej Tonderski, Warta River Basin
Case Study: Poland,Background Paper22 (World Bank Research Working Paper, 2004).
168. Blomquist et al., supra note 143, at 16.

169.
170.

See id. at 23.
Id. at 21.
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IWRM."' As a result, Poland is not enforcing the important principle
that policy and planning should inform one another.'
C.

FRANCE

The European Union Water Framework Directive also binds
France, an EU member.13 However, France had a system of basin
management in place prior to the advent of the WFD. The country has
seven basins which it manages in six parts,'74 each with its own Basin
Committee and Water Agency, which act as an executive implementation arm. 7

5

The Board of Directors of the Water Agency contains rep-

resentatives of the Basin Committee. The Agency must consult the
Committees in relation to certain subjects, including the setting of the
tariffs levied for water withdrawals and pollution discharges, and on
the priorities the Agencies must follow in their five year programs.
The Prefect of the Basin charges each Basin Committee to prepare
and approve the Master Development and Water Management Plan
This plan sets out "the basic guidelines for the balanced
("SDAGE").
management of water resources,' 7 8 and Basin Committees must seek
the participation of relevant state and government bodies. 9 If those
bodies do not submit comments within four months, the Basin Committee can assume the state and government bodies approve the
SDAGE.'8 0
The members of these Basin Committees come from three principal sectors: the state (including representatives from relevant ministries); water users (including environmental uses); and relevant regional and local councils.' These are substantially-sized bodies, with

171. Id. at 20.
172. See id. at 31.
173. Council Directive 2000/60, supranote 138, art. 24.
174. See Organization of Water Management in France,
http://semide.oieau.fr/EN/topics/part-a.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2007) for a list of
the six river basins.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Law No. 92-3 ofJanuary 3, 1992,Journal Officiel de la Rrpublique Franiaise
U.O] [Official Gazette of France],Jan. 4, 1992, art. 3 available at
http://oieau.fr/anglais/gest-eau/Iois/westlaw92.htm.
178. Id.
179. Id.

180.

Id.

http://www.eau-rhinRhin-Meuse,
de leau
181. See generally L'agence
meuse.fr/anglais.htm; IOWater - Organization of Water Management in France,
http://oieau.fr/anglais/gesteau/parta.htm (breaking down the membership of all
basin committees. The tendency appears to be that representatives of users, communities and "socio-professionals" together make up around half of each committee, in
contrast to the position in Kazakhstan).
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around one hundred members, which the seventy-seven member Comit6 National de l'Eau represents at the national level.8
With respect to information availability, the Arhus Convention
has been implemented directly in France through Law No. 2002285 of February 2, 2003. ' There have been no approaches made by
the public to the Compliance Committee regarding possible transgressions by France in the implementation of this Law," 4 which may indicate either that the public is unaware that such a procedure is possible,
or that the law is working well.
D. SCOTLAND

Although Scotland is another EU nation governed by the Water
Framework Directive, the approach has been less formalized than the
French approach. Scotland's approach has been to establish River Basin District Advisory Groups ("RBDAGs"), which the Scottish Parliament created under the WFD transposition legislation, the Water Environment and Water Services (Scotland) Act 2003."' Despite the fact
that Scotland has only one principal River Basin District covering the
vast majority of the country, " there are ten RBDAGs, eight of them in
the Scotland RBD.' 7 In addition, there is a National Stakeholder Forum, which has no legislative basis, and is representative of the major
water users and NGOs in Scotland.'
The water regulator, the Scottish

182. Scottish Parliament Information Centre SPICe Briefing 02/96, Water Environment and Water Services Bill: River Basin Planning,at 8 SB 2/96 (August 26 2002), available at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/pdf resbrief/sb0296.pdf.
183. Law No. 2002-2855 of Feb. 28, 2002,Journal Officiel de la R~publique
Francaise JO] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 1, 2002, p. 3904; The Arhus Convention was transposed into European Community law through Directive 2003/4/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28January 2003 on public access to
environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC. Council
Directive 2003/4, art. 3, 11 2003 O.J. (L 41) 28 (EC). See also the declarations made by
the EC and a number of its members, including France, on signature, approval or
ratification of the Arhus Convention, availableat
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ctreaty.htm.
184. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Arhus Convention Compliance Committee, http://www.unece.org/env/pp/pubcom.htm.
185. Water Environment and Water Services (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 3), 17,
availableat www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/acts2003/pdf/asp-20030003-en.pdf.
186. Water Framework Directive (WFD) Scotland: River Basin Management,
http://www.sepa.org.uk/wfd/rbmp/index.htm.
187. Water Framework Directive (WFD) Scotland: River Basin Management,
http://www.sepa.org.uk/wfd/rbmp/aag.htm.
188. Water Framework Directive (WFD) Scotland: Stakeholder Groups,
http://www.sepa.org.uk/wfd/stake/index.htm. See also
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Environment/Water/ 17316/NSFNovember2004
(showing that the most recent minutes available from meetings of this group date back
to November 2004).
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Environmental Protection Agency ("SEPA"), which is responsible for
establishing the remit of the RBDAGs, takes the view that the fundamental function of the groups is to prepare sub-basin plans for their
respective areas.' 9
Local priorities and issues heavily influence the membership of
these RBDAGs, but SEPA says the membership will represent public
authorities, major water users and local stakeholders.9 SEPA envisions
that the RBDAGs themselves will set up broader forums in their respective areas to allow wider membership beyond that of the groups
represented on the advisory groups."'
Like France, Scotland, as a part of the United Kingdom, is bound
by the Arhus Convention as implemented through Directive
2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information.9 This has
been transposed into Scots law by the Environmental Information
(Scotland) Regulations 2004.'9IV. CONCLUSIONS
From the approaches taken elsewhere in the world, it appears that
States are increasingly using representative basin bodies because they

Scottish Environment Protection Agency [SEPA] River Basin PlanningStrategy for
189.
the Scotland River BasinDistrict at 14 (2005) available at
http://www.sepa.org.uk/pdf/wfd/rbmp/strategy/rbmp-strategy.pdf. Such sub-basin
plans are intended to cover the following:
* identify key priorities for environmental improvement and protection within
the area;
* identify actions and measures to deliver environmental improvement and protection;
" provide advice on the use of alternative objectives (seesection 1.4);
* identify improvements in the coordination and integration of different plans
help to better protect the water environand policies for the area that will
ment and promote its sustainable use;
• coordinate relevant consultation and participation activities within the area;
and
* consider the need for, and use of, further detailed plans and programmes. (id.
at 14).
Id.
190.
Id. at 18.
191.
Council Directive 2003/4, 2003 art. 10, 2003 O.J. (L 041) 26 (EC), available at
192.
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/environmental-info-reg/detailed
specialist-guides/european-directive_ (eur-lex) .pdf.
193. The Environmental Information (Scotland) Regulations, 2004, 520, available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/ssi2004/20040520.htm; see also Freedom
of Information (Scotland) Act, 2002, (A.S.P.13), availableat
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/en2002/aspen-20020013_en.pdf (providing a general right, with some exceptions, to the information held by public authorities in Scotland (§ 1), and establishes the post of Scottish Information Commissioner
(§ 42) to oversee compliance with both the Act and the Environmental Information
(Scotland) Regulations).
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are anxious to improve the level of public participation in water management. The success of these efforts is less certain, however. Although States generally accept the value of such bodies in principle,
assessing the success of their implementation is more difficult, given
that most are recent, or planned, innovations. Kazakhstan, and the
Nura River in particular, demonstrate the specific problems of effective
implementation. These problems result from a number of broad factors, chief among them:
" uncertainty caused by vague, contradictory, or missing legislative provisions;
" institutional issues, caused by a mismatch between the powers endowed by legislation and the functions of the institution, or capacity problems;
" inadequacy and paucity of available information;
" a focus on the RBC as the fundamental means for achieving
stakeholder participation; and
" slow acceptance on the part of institutions and stakeholders
regarding the involvement of the latter in decision-making.
Merely improving the legal regime would be an inappropriate tool
to properly address issues relating to physical institutional capacity
problems. An improved regulatory system, however, could affect the
other factors, although it is clear that making the legal framework
more effective is not the only mechanism that Kazakhstan might utilize.
It must be borne in mind that the governance framework within
which the water management regime operates, must establish the credibility and legitimacy of the bodies involved. Without these elements,
the respect that organizations engender from stakeholders will fail rapidly. Credibility and legitimacy are achieved through good governance. The World Bank has argued that four principles underlie good
government: accountability, participation, predictability, and transparency. 194
These, then, are the "ingredients" of good governance, and must
be in place if policies are to be successfully implemented. In this case,
the policy goal is IWRM. The authors of this paper would suggest that
if a State is to satisfy these four "ingredients" of good governance, the
following elements must be in place in the state's regulatory framework
for water resource management:

194. Asian Dev. Bank [ADB] Governance:Sound Development Management, 7-13,
(1999), availableat
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Governance/govpolicy.pdf.
195. Id. at 4.
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1. Clear standards of behaviour / performance;
2. Clearly set out functions and responsibilities;
3. Enforcement capacity, commensurate with rights and responsibilities;
4. Rigorous compliance monitoring;
5. Clearly laid out procedures;
6. Open availability of information;
7. Comprehensive / unambiguous criteria to be applied in decision-making; and
8. Protection of 'silent' interests (for example, ecosystems, gender
balance, and disadvantaged social groups).
This paper principally addresses stakeholder participation, but states
cannot achieve the above four factors independently of one another.9
Consequently, if a state's aim is effective participation, then stakeholders must see participation in the wider context of good governance. This links well with the principles of IWRM, one of which emphasizes the importance of a participatory approach. 97' It also means
that states cannot see River Basin Councils, for example, in isolation
from the governance framework within which they have to work.
A.

UNCERTAINTY CAUSED BYVAGUE, CONTRADICTORY, OR MISSING

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

A number of significant problems have been identified above, all of
which would have a potential effect on the extent to which stakeholders become involved in decision-making. The licensing of water use is
tainted by factors such as the fact that licensing is not governed by
clear, unambiguous criteria, as is the case for example in South Africa.
Ambiguity swathes the procedures for suspension and termination of

196. See also Global Water Partnership, Technical Comm. [TEC], Effective Water Governance, 28 TEC Background Papers No. 7 (February 2003) (prepared by Peter Rogers &
Alan W. Hall), availableat
9 6
http://www.wcainfonet.org/servlet/BinaryDownloaderServlet?filename=10625000 2
of
levels
on
all
depends
crucially
("Participation
48_governance.pdf&reflD=102368
government following an inclusive approach when developing and implementing policies. Broad participation is built on social mobilisation and freedom of association and
speech, as well as capacities to participate constructively. Transparency and accountability are built on the free flow of information. Governance institutions and systems
need to communicate among the actors and stakeholders in very direct ways. Correctly
done, this will lead civil society to be socialised into governance over a wide range of
issues.").
197. See The Int'l Conference on Water and the Env't, Dublin Statement on Water and
SustainableDevelopment (Jan. 31, 1992), availableat
http://www.inpim.org/files/Documents/DublinStatmt.pdf.
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water use rights, and these problems combine to increase the possibility that the law is perceived as being inconsistently applied.
The uncertainty relating to basin agreements does not improve
stakeholder involvement. In addition to the lack of clarity regarding
the aims and objectives of basin agreements, there is nothing in the
Water Code to refute the idea that basin agreements might be bilateral. The implication, then, is that it may be possible for a single basin to
be associated with a number of basin agreements, encompassing different users and different regulatory authorities, with no strict requirements as to signatories or priority. Serious questions then arise
with respect to the way in which RBCs would interact with each basin
agreement grouping, and how a variety of possibly bilateral agreements
might best serve the cause of IWRM on any particular basin.
The distinction between primary and secondary users may also be
of great importance when identifying stakeholders. For example,
should River Basin Councils count farmers or industrial users who take
water from commercially-run canals as stakeholders for the purposes of
River Basin Council membership, even though they are not connected
to the licensing authority in any direct way? If not, stakeholder involvement has the potential to be under-representative, with representation only for commercial users of water, as primary users. There appear to be no binding rules regulating the balance of members in
RBCs, and it appears that the guidelines that do exist have been
flouted in the Nura basin. This does nothing to embolden NGOs or
individuals to get involved with RBCs, especially as they are unable to
participate in the RBC meetings, unless the RBC expressly invites
them.198
B. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (CAUSED BY MISMATCHES BETWEEN THE
POWERS ENDOWED BY LEGISLATION AND THE FUNCTIONS OF

INSTITUTIONS), OR CAPACITY

ADB and UNDP projects have extensively documented institutional
problems in the water management field in Kazakhstan." Ultimately,
too many bodies are involved in the management of Kazakhstan's waters, but none has ultimate managerial responsibility. Ground and
surface waters are also not managed in an integrated manner, as different organizations have varying responsibilities over each."'0 There
are perennial problems with the lack of capacity of the RBO, both in
the form of a lack of financial resources, and the absence of staff who

198.
199.

See STANDARD REGULATIONS FOR RIVER BAsIN CouNciLs, supra note 97, 8.
See Schwaiger, supra note 24; KAZAKHSTAN NATIONAL INTEGRATED WATER
REsOURCES MANAGEMENT & WATER EFFICIENCY PLAN, DRAFT 2005, supra note 23.
200. See KAZAKHSTAN NATIONAL INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT& WATER
EFFICIENCY PLAN, DRAFT 2005, supranote 23, § 11.1.
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are able to monitor and enforce decisions."' Consequently, the RBO
must rely on the users themselves for the information it needs to monitor compliance, and this leads directly to allegations and suspicions of
institutional impotence by users. Both these allegations and the fact
that the Committee for Water Resources is not wholly impartial, and
cannot hope to compete with local executive bodies unless it becomes
a ministry in its own right, damage the RBO's credibility.
With respect to the River Basin Council, its general inability to
produce binding recommendations, other than potentially for the basin scheme, must be regarded as detrimental to its effectiveness. It is
true, as the UNDP points out, the body at this stage is not fully formed,
and it will develop as users become more confident in their ability and
desire to get involved."'2 As the stakeholders' voices get louder, they
will be able to assume more powers. However, the RBC will need a
robust base in the regulatory framework, with detailed provisions setting out mechanisms for its involvement, something that is currently
missing. Its membership should be clearly defined, although without
identifying the individual organizations to be represented, such that
the appropriate balances between interested parties are set and adhered to. The Scottish system, which will identify stakeholders in the
context of each water body, would seem useful in that regard. However, the non-binding recommendations regarding balancing members
that exists in Kazakhstan already, if implemented, would be far more
useful. It raises the more general question of the role of the RBO in
running the RBC. The RBO controls membership in the RBC to a very
large degree, and the RBC is dependent upon the RBO for its financing.
C. INADEQUACY AND PAUCITY OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION

As the article stated above, the RBOs rely on Kazhydromet for data
on surface waters, but suffer from the latter's inclination to produce
inaccurate information for exorbitant sums.2 ' This must hamper the
RBO's ability to fulfill even the limited functions it currently has, and
thereby further diminishes its standing among stakeholders. This
problem necessitates an increase in funding for Kazhydromet, to enable it to upgrade its monitoring network and produce more realistically
priced data. It may be that the culture of the organization needs to
change. One must also ask if the RBOs should continue to rely on
Kazhydromet for data at all if the latter remains at least semicommercial in character. Kazakhstan could address this problem by
strengthening the RBO's monitoring capacity.
201.
202.
203.

Id. § 8.1-8.2.
Id.§9.1.
See TWiNBAS FINAL WORK PACKAGE REPORT, supra note 35, at app. 3.
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More generally, the Kazakh government must adhere to its obligations under the Arhus Convention. 4 In its Decision, the Compliance
Committee found Kazakhstan specifically in breach of Articles 3, 4, and
9 of the Convention, with respect to the availability of environmental
information and access to justice,2

15

and Article 6 in relation to public

participation 6 Although Kazakhstan has had Communications critical
of its implementation of the Convention submitted to the Compliance
Committee four times, more than any other Party, only two of these
have formed the basis of further action. 7 Interestingly, the rationale
behind the Decision of the Parties appears to lie in the practicalities of
implementing the existing provisions in Kazakh law that purport to
transpose the Arhus obligations, and are based on communications
passed to the Committee by Kazakh NGOs
It therefore seems that
the provisions that exist in Kazakh legislation are going in the right
direction, but will rely on further education, and possibly financing, at
relevant institutions and courts. Also, Kazakhstan would be welladvised to implement the Convention in a single cross-cutting instrument, as has been the practice in the European Union, instead of relying on individual provisions, and attempting to safeguard access to
information added to legislation on a case-by-case basis.0
D. SLOW ACCEPTANCE ON THE PART OF INSTITUTIONS AND
STAKEHOLDERS REGARDING THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE LATTER IN
DECISION-MAKING
The Arhus Convention Compliance Committee specifically complained that institutions and stakeholders in Kazakhstan have been
slow to accept the involvement of stakeholders in decision-making. '
The authors hope that Kazakhstan will address this issue as above,
principally through educational means. This process will take time,
204. See Ministry of Env't Prot. of the Republic of Kaz. & Org. for Sec. and Cooperation in Eur., supra note 83, at 4.
205. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, supra note 135, 1 1. Committee that was critical
of Kazakhstan's implementation of the Convention to the Compliance Committee four
times, more than any other Party, only two of these complaints gave the Committee
basis for further action. The second meeting of the Parties took place in Almaty, and
the next meeting must occur within two years of the last one, unless the parties agree.
206. Id. 3.
207. Arhus Convention, supranote 126, art. 10(1).
208. See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Compliance Committee,
supra note 184, for all public communications to the Compliance Committee.
209. Within the context of the Arhus Convention, it should be pointed out that
commentators have raised questions regarding the potential for obstruction to justice
for those bringing cases under environmental protection legislation. See, e.g., Yuliya
Mitrofanskaya & Daulet Bideldinov, Modernizing Environmental Protection in Kazakhstan,
12 GEO. INT'L ENrL. L. REiw. 177, 205 (1999-2000).
210. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, supra note 135, 1 3.
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and will rely on the stakeholders establishing sufficient trust in the system and in the relevant institutions, until their legitimacy becomes
entrenched. It is the view of the authors that this process will only take
place when Kazakhstan makes changes in the regulatory framework, so
that good governance is clearly in place.
E. A Focus ON THE RBC AS THE FUNDAMENTAL MEANS FOR ACHIEVING
STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION

The River Basin Council system is, to some degree, novel. Kazakhstan might make a greater effort to ensure that other methods
beyond the establishment of RBCs are adopted to ensure stakeholder
participation. The South African system outlined above seeks to control the directors of management authorities, as well as ensure that
stakeholder participation occurs at the implementation level. Kazakhstan should adopt this approach as well. This will encourage
transparency, with corresponding impacts on accountability, and will
lead to an increased quality of governance. Kazakhstan, by seeking to
improve governance, can only increase the standing and value of the
RBC.
It appears from the above conclusions that the Republic of Kazakhstan is driving its policies and regulatory framework in the right
direction to improve its water management, but a number of factors
are hampering progress. The solution to overcoming these problems
lies partly in institutional reorganization and improvements to relevant
legislation to ensure that institutions with appropriate powers and
commensurate enforcement capacity manage Kazakhstan's waters effectively and sustainably. Kazakhstan must also incorporate stakeholder views into decision-making, as its international obligations demand.
Kazakhstan's introduction of River Basin Councils is a step forward in
achieving stakeholder involvement, but this in itself will not be the panacea that some anticipate. It must accompany the introduction of
RBCs with other enhancements to the governance regime if these organizations are to fulfil their full potential. Institutional inertia and
unwillingness on the part of some stakeholders to accept their new
roles will doubtless slow the process down. The authors would suggest
that the above recommendations would go some way towards making
sure that the basin councils provide a forceful voice for stakeholders in
the context of properly integrated water resource management in Kazakhstan.

